For those who missed the last
post, we concluded that, through Lewis’ modal realism, we can now say such
things as “when I said I could have been a doctor, I mean that in some possible
worlds, my counterpart is a doctor”. Okay! We have counterparts in possible
worlds, and these counterparts help us make sense of our modal expressions.
However, how do we know anything about these counterparts? This is now the main
worry of philosophers, because like I explained in post 002, it makes no matter
how you explain, if what you used to explain are not clear enough, then sorry,
your explanation could be read in any direction. We shall be concerned with
this ultimate question in this post and in the few ones to come.
You might think
this should not be a worry but you will understand why it is more a mystery
than a worry in a jiffy. Despite the shortcomings of Lewis’ modal realism, many
philosophers still think Lewis is closer to the truth than those others who
align more to commonsense than Lewis cared to.But if Lewis is closer to the
truth, then it seems impossible that we know about modal objects. According to
Lewis, possible worlds are not like our planets because we cannot have any
cause and effect relationship with them. We cannot travel to them and we cannot
telescopically view them to see anything happening there. Possible worlds are
isolated from us and from one another. We immediately see that we would not be
able to know about these worlds and what happens in them, because the way we
know things involves cause and effect. Let us pick on colors and consider how
we know about them. Now, imagine a blind person. Would that blind person be
able to know what colors are? Your guess is as good mine. Our photo receptors
rely on sensory data from objects to enable our brain decipher what color the
object’s surface is covered with. The same process applies to music. A deaf
person would not have the slightest idea what sounds are. In sum, if not all,
most of what we are certain about involves processes that is essentially cause
and effect. I believe you now see why how we know about modal facts is more a
mystery than a worry. On one hand, it seems we have a pretty good idea of what
we are talking about, and on the other hand, it seems we cannot have any idea
of what we are talking about when we express modal statements.
In any case,
there seems not be too difficult a task for us humans, we always have a way to
make it seem less mountainous. Thus, some philosophers have done the same with
this problem of how do we know about modal facts. None of these theories are
conclusive by the way. So it perfectly makes sense if you say this is nonsense;
and that is exactly why I began by saying there is no problem that is so
troublesome for philosophers than this problem. I shall in the course of the
following posts, discuss three of these theories and I leave you to decide
which is the most sensible. These three theories include those who think we can
know about modal objects by (1) conceiving and imagining, (2) understanding the
words used in our modal expressions, and (3) understanding how counterfactuals
work. So let us start with those who think we can know about modal objects by
conceiving and imagining. But before I start, let me point out that these
theories are constructed with heavy philosophical codes and languages. But do
not fret, this blog is created for particularly this reason; to explain in
clear terms what may ordinarily look too philosophical. However, in a bit to do
that, many important aspects may be taken out along the way, so I implore that
we join the curious minds and scramble through the attached documents after
reading this introductory blog.
The two main
guys in the camp of those who think we know about modal objects through
conceiving and imagining are Stephen Yablo of University of Michigan and David
Chalmers of University of Arizona. So we begin with Yablo. Yablo thinks that conceiving
and imagining are key to how we know about modal objects. In the preceding
post, I asked you to imagine a newly discovered crab, and we moved to the
conclusion that in some possible worlds, such crabs existed. What Yablo did was
to take advantage of that and rigorously develop a theory out from it. Let me
explain it this way to make it easier to comprehend. We have agreed earlier
that possible worlds are out there. Their content unknown to us and unaffected
by us. But you have just imagined a crab which does not exist in our world. the
only way this crab will exist in some possible world is if the crab does not
exclude all other situations in that world. For instance, your reading this
blog at this moment is a situation in this world. It could exist as a situation
because it allows other situations in this world such as, your waking up this
morning, my posting this blog, and many others, to exist. In the same way, the
imagined crab can only exist as a situation in possible worlds, if in those
worlds it allows other situations which are part of that world to exist. In
this way, the possible world verifies the imagined crab. So, Yablo came up with
a principle that when you can imagine that can verify your imagined crab, then
your crab exists as a situation in that world.
But there is a
problem which Yablo must surmount. He must show that we were not able to
imagine the crab because we already know that the imagined crab could exist.
That is, he must show that we moved from conceiving the crab to knowing about
the crab rather than moving from knowing about the crab to conceiving the crab.
This is a problem because more often than not, conceiving works only when we
have some knowledge about what we are conceiving. This is where the ingenuity
of Yablo came in. He was able to demonstrate that even though conceiving
objects works in this way, that is not what we do when we conceive modal
objects. Yablo used examples from the philosophical world to demonstrate his
point, but I would resist the urge to use them here. I take you to the
scientific world since you believe more the scientist than the philosopher.
There is a cluster of chemical elements called transuranic; they are the
elements which for a long time remained objects of imagination. Mendelev’s
periodic table contains all and only the existing and known elements. However,
scientists were able to use the periodic table to conceive some elements that
were not on the periodic table, i.e. elements that we did not know existed. They
predicted accurately the properties of these elements and their periodic
numbers using the affordances of Mendelev’s periodic table. Later on after many
years, these elements were discovered and the properties and periodic numbers
which we ascribed to them purely out of imagination and conception, were bull’s
eye accurate. So you see that in some cases, conceiving precedes knowing. This
was how Yablo surmounted the big problem.
In this way, you
might think Yablo can be implicated that everything and anything you conceive
is possible, but you would be wrong. Yablo saw this implication and he further
said; sometimes we conceive so-and-so, but we are unware that such-and-such
makes so-and-so impossible if such-and-such is true. If this happens, we are
entitled to hold that so-and-so is metaphysically possible (that means
so-and-so exits in some possible world) only as far as we remain ignorant of
the truth of such-and-such. Once we are aware that such-and-such is true, and
that such-and-such makes so-and-so impossible, then our conceiving so-and-so
does not entail that so-and-so is possible. I told you these guys were
interesting; now you have seen. I am almost at the mark of a thousand five
hundred words, so I fear we must resume discourse about Chalmers in the next
post. See you then and I hope you have had a fruitful reading. For the curious
minds, the first ten pages of Yablo’s paper is recommended.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
53: 1-42.
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