You are able to
imagine the newly discovered crab because you know that however bizarre it mightbe;
it must share most of its parts with the different kinds of crab you have seen
in the past. In the preceding post, we encountered ‘counterparts’, and they are
persons in possible worlds who have very close similarities with us. When I
made an analogy with Barry Hallen and his friends, you should have noticed that
the differences between Barry who is the flash in our world, and the Barry who
is not the flash in earth2 are mostly matters that are external to Barry. That
is, those things that are internal to Barry are more often than not constant in
both worlds. Let us go through a different route to make this clearer. Barry in
both worlds have the same parents, but in one he is married to West and in the
other, he only had a crush that was just becoming a thing. Okay, take the part
of Barry from birth up to the point of marriage in earth2; you will see that
there is no difference whatsoever between that part of Barry and the part of
Barry from birth to that point of no-marriage in earth1. Those two parts are
called duplicates because they are not different from each other in any way
imaginable.So, back to your crab. The parts which you imagined that the newly
discovered crab has in common with the crabs you have seen in the parts are
duplicates of one another.
Just as you were
able to imagine the newly discovered crab because you know it has some parts
which are duplicates of the crabs you are already familiar with, so also are
possible objects and possible individuals generate from duplicates parts of
objects and individuals of this world. I give you a vivid example. Since the
unicorn does not exist in our world but could have existed, then there is a
possible world where the unicorn exists. But how is the unicorn generated in
that world? Simple: from duplicate parts of objects in this world. As you can
tell, wings, horn and horse are all the parts of the unicorn and they are all
duplicates of objects in this world. However, there are also alien individuals.
These are objects and individuals whose parts are not generated from any
duplicate parts of any object or individuals in this world. In this way, you
cannot imagine these alien individuals or objects no matter how much you try,
but they are nonetheless still out there in many possible worlds. Whatever you
can imagine, is imaginable because at least one of its parts is a duplicate part
of an object in this world. This is how Lewis thinks possible objects and
individuals are generated.Okay, that is it about Lewis and his modal realism.
Now, many of Lewis’
fellows think that his theory strays so far away from commonsense and as such
it is a costly theory. Costly because if you accept it you would have to let go
of many commonsensical facts that we know. Thus, they offer to give theories that
are more friendly to commonsense than Lewis’ theory. The major difference
between their theories and that of Lewis is that possible worlds for them are
not real and concrete. For these friends of commonsense, possible worlds are
abstract entities in the manner in which numbers are abstract. When I say
numbers are abstract, I mean that there is no museum you go to where you can
see and touch the number 2 or any of the numbers. I do not mean two things or a
carved stature of 2, but the number 2 itself. So just as there is no place
where numbers are concrete, so also possible worlds are not concrete. If
possible worlds are not concrete and only the actual world is concrete, then
possible worlds are not the same kind of entities like the actual world. This
will automatically make the actual world superior to all other possible worlds.
According to these
guys, possible worlds remain counterfactuals quite alright but they are only
mere expressions and figments of our imagination. These guys take logical space
to be strictly logical space, that is, the space in which we reason and conjure
up entities so as to make sense of what seems nonsensical. In this way, there
is only one world in the strictest sense of it and that world is our world, no
more no less. They have some interesting things to say about how these
expressions and figments of imagination count as possible worlds but I will not
go into those things because they take us far away from our goal. I know! I
know‼ I know‼! I’m biased. I get to talk so eloquently about Lewis and I even
did not as little as mention these other guys’ names. You will have to forgive
me. In fairness, these other guys are really not boring, they are pretty
interesting, in the level and quality in which Lewis is. But errrr…. I just
don’t think they are as close to the truth as Lewis is. I tell you why I think
this way. But before I do that, let me give you some names so that I don’t
utterly transform myself into a jackass. The renowned list of thinkers who
think that possible worlds are in the manner I have just described include
great minds like Alvin Plantinga, Robert Stalnaker, Robert Adams, Peter van
Inwagen, Robert Jeffrey, and many others.
Remember the
circular explanation I mentioned in post #2? I said that the kind of
explanation that ‘flying is when you fly’ we give kids when they ask us to
explains ‘flying’ is an example of a circular explanation. We are merely taking
the kid on a joy-ride of a Merry-go-round. Now, consider Lewis theory and these
other commonsense-friendly theories. On one hand, we can say using Lewis theory
that situations that could have happened but didn’t happen in our world,
happened at some possible world. In this way, we are not making any circular
explanation when we attempt to explain our modal statements. On the other hand,
however, should we say the situations that could have happened but did not are
not real situations in some possible worlds, that they are mere expressions and
figments of our imagination, then we are doing no more than telling a kid
‘flying is when you fly’ when we attempt to explain our modal expressions. What
would you say; “what I mean when I say I could have been a doctor is that ‘I
could have been a doctor’?” or “I mean that in my imagination, I am a doctor?”
These are idiotic explanations to say the least. I for one will tell; “Hey!
Wake up dummy, this is real life not an imagined world and you ain’t no doctor”.
This is why I think Lewis serves us better if explaining our modal expressions
is our target. If the reasons we cannot explain modality is precisely because
modality are facts that are not real, then let’s make the goddamn thing real
and be done with looking foolish whenever we are asked to explain ourselves
when we express modal statements. Lewis affords us the tools to do just that.
We cannot say the same about these other guys.
So thus it was
that we come to the end of our discourse on the metaphysics of modality. Next
week post, will begin with our quest to explain how we come to know anything
about possible objects and possible state of affairs. Attach here is Lewis’
book in which he defends his theory that worlds are real and that ours is but
one among these many worlds. I have also attached some files of the other guys
I think are more readily understandable. As always, this is just for the
curious minds. The blog itself is supposed to be a condensed version of what
they said. In any case, I hope to see you again next week.
Loux, Michael. The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the
Metaphysics of Modality. Cornell University Press, 1979. (This is a
collection of most of the important contributions on the metaphysics of
modality. In it you find the works of the guys whose names I mentioned above).
Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
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