ON THE MODALS VI: Epistemic Modality II

Modalities are insanely and indescribably troublesome. From the ‘what do we mean’ to the ‘how do we know’ problems, philosophers still lose sleep on them and wake up thinking about them. However, things are getting better. We have seen Lewis solution to the former and we have seen Yablo with the latter. According to Yablo, we move from conceiving and imagining to knowing about the existence of modal objects. This week, we move on to Chalmers, who like Yablo also thinks we know about modal objects by our ability to imagine and conceive. In fairness, Chalmers can be seen as a rigorous development on Yablo. However, his rigorous attempt leaves much for amazement, and that is why he is worthy of consideration.

ON THE MODALS V: Epistemic Modality I

Nothing has proven so much a pain in the neck of the philosophers than the problem of “how do we know about modal facts, if modal facts and modal objects are out there in logical space and independent of our thought?” The worry is no longer “what do we mean when we express modal statements?” because we now have a clear understanding of what we mean, thanks to Lewis.

ON THE MODALS IV: Metaphysical Modality III

The last feature of Lewis’ modal realism which I promised to begin with this week is the feature that explains how possible objects and possible individuals are generated. Surely, they do not just pop up out of the blues, and if any theory is going to explain possible worlds exhaustively, there is no escaping how the inhabitants of these possible worlds come to be. Okay, let’s begin! If you are reading a scientific magazine and you encountered a section where the report of a new discovery of the specie of crabs is contained, but there was no diagram of the newly discovered crab. I’m quite certain that despite the lack of pictures to give you a clear understanding of what the crab might look like, you will nonetheless still be able to imagine what the crab look like. I tell you why.

ON THE MODALS III: Metaphysical Modality II

This week, we look at David Lewis’ theory that our world is one out of the infinite number of worlds in logical space. We ended the last point at the intersection of explaining modal statements in possible-worlds terms, i.e. we explain ‘I could have been a doctor’ as ‘In some possible world, I am a doctor even though I am not a doctor in this world’.

ON THE MODALS II: Metaphysical Modality I

In the last post, I concluded by saying modality divides majorly into two main aspects; modal metaphysics and modal epistemology. I also said I will begin with modal epistemology in this post and henceforth until we conclude all discussions on the matter before moving on to modal epistemology. But before I begin properly, let me anticipate modal epistemology by providing definitions of both aspects of modality. Modal metaphysics deals with the nature of modal operators (I hope you remember what modal operators are? They are ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’). Modal metaphysics asks whether there are any characters to these operators. Modal epistemology on the other hand concerns itself with how these modal operators relate with us; whether we can have knowledge of these kinds. So over to the task at hand. Over to modal metaphysics.

ON THE MODALS I: A History

Modality in philosophy is an important concept, so much so that it cuts across almost all the branches of philosophy. In metaphysics, logic and epistemology, modality is a central topic –a minuscule trait has even filtered into ethics. Be that as it may, what in the first place, makes modality so much important and central to contemporary philosophizing? Let us begin from what the concept means.